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This paper investigates the management control systems used by multinational corporation 
headquarters to control wholly owned foreign subsidiaries. Our theory development is based 
on transaction cost economics. First we conduct a series of exploratory interviews, providing 
an insight into the context, and second we provide some empirical evidence based on cross 
sectional survey data. Our results indicate that activity traits (uncertainty, asset specificity and 
post hoc information impactedness) have significant implications on control choices, in 
particular the control archetype combinations chosen by headquarters, although not all results 











Wholly owned foreign subsidiary (WOFS) entities have and continue to be important 
vehicles for firms seeking to capitalise on foreign market opportunities, particularly with the 
removal of foreign ownership barriers throughout the world (Colombage, Gunasekarage, and 
Shams 2014). However the success of such ventures is mixed (Eden and Miller 2004) and 
accordingly investigating a comprehensive set of control determinants and the associated 
control mechanisms is a fundamental step. The objective of this paper is to investigate the 
choice of management control systems exercised by headquarters controlling WOFS 
operations, broadly based on a transaction cost economics (TCE) approach proposed by 
Speklé (2001). 
The motivation for conducting this study is twofold. First WOFS entities are an integral and 
economically significant part of the Australian economy. The net value of Australian 
companies abroad is appropriately AUD$875 billion and this continues to expand between 
AUD$20 million and AUD$30 billion per year, with much of it relating to WOFS 
operations1. Hence we aim to provide some guidance to practice concerning the management 
control systems exercised and characteristics associated with these choices. Our second 
motivation is that much of the research in this area frequently considers only a narrow set of 
control choices (Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe 2013; Dossi and Patelli 2008). It is surprising 
there is not more comprehensive consideration of controlling WOFS, particularly concerning 
research in the Asia Pacific region (Chenhall and Smith 2011; Benson et al. Forthcoming; 
Benson, Faff, and Smith 2014), given the importance of these entities for multinational 
corporations and control problems faced (Mason 2007). Accordingly we aim to develop a 
more comprehensive approach by drawing from Speklé’s (2001) TCE theory of management 
control as a starting point in this study. 
1 See Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australia Economic Indicators, September 2014. 
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The WOFS context is characterised by some unique factors, aligning with TCE theory. These 
include internal networks, external networks and strategic choices which are critical to the 
viability of WOFS operations given the knowledge acquisition they facilitate (Forsgren, 
Pedersen, and Foss 1999; Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist 2002). These network and 
strategic factors lead to a variation in knowledge at different organisational levels, a key 
driver of headquarters degree of uncertainty concerning WOFS operations (Williamson, 
1979). Further, networks developed and strategic choices are related to the asset specificity of 
WOFS operations and post hoc information impactedness from headquarters’ perspective 
(Williamson, 1979). Therefore WOFS operations can be characterised according to the link 
between activity traits (uncertainty, asset specificity and post hoc information impactedness) 
described in transaction cost economics (TCE) theory and the problems headquarters face, 
which can be addressed through management control systems. A number of studies assert the 
relevance of TCE theory to aid in the explanation of control choices, including Spicer and 
Ballew (1983), Bogaard and Speklé (2003).  
We start by conducting a series of exploratory interviews to gain an insight into the 
applicability of TCE theory and modify Speklé’s (2001) conceptualisation consistent with the 
control choices and associations with activity traits observed in the WOFS context. These 
insights inform the development of a survey we conduct, so it is meaningful in the context 
examined (Abernethy et al. 1999). Survey data is collected from 159 firms to more 
comprehensively examine the control of WOFS operations. Our findings indicate that 
headquarters do not choose a single set of control choices, as proposed by Speklé (2001), 
rather they choose combinations of the sets of control proposed. These sets of control choices 
are associated to a certain extent with the activity traits observed. 
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This study contributes to literature in a number of ways. First, literature concerning the 
control of foreign subsidiaries rarely distinguishes between wholly owned operations and 
joint venture operations (Jaussaud and Schaaper 2006). Generalising the implications of 
findings from this literature is problematic, given headquarters controlling joint ventures are 
faced with unique issues associated with sharing control, bargaining power and competing 
partner interests (Chalos and O'Connor 2004; Emsley and Kison 2007). Headquarters 
controlling WOFS operations need to deal with and control foreign operations alone, in 
sometimes unfamiliar markets. Second, literature often deals with one or a limited number of 
control mechanisms in each study (such as performance measurement systems), rather than 
more comprehensive sets of control mechanisms or control packages (Sandelin 2008; Malmi 
and Brown 2008). Through examining this unique context and broader set of control choices 
within it, we contribute to developing a more comprehensive understanding of that is relevant 
to both theory development and practice (Merchant 2012). 
The next section explains the implications of TCE and Speklé’s (2001) theory which we refer 
to when examining this context. The suggestions, from a series of exploratory interviews, 
then provide insight into TCE applicability in this context. The analysis of the survey data is 
then presented, following by the findings and conclusion.  
2. Theory development 
2.1 Control problems facing headquarters and transaction cost economics 
The problems headquarters face when controlling WOFS operations at a distance are 
captured through the activity traits described in TCE theory (Williamson 1979, 2005). In this 
study activity traits are essentially descriptors of a WOFS (domain of transactions) from the 
perspective of headquarters. Activity traits in the presence of human traits, bounded 
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rationality and opportunism, are argued to lead to control problems. This section defines and 
describes these activity traits and associated human traits in the context of WOFS operations. 
Uncertainty refers to the specificity of intended performance and activities of WOFS 
operations (ex ante) and is associated with the predictability of the WOFS context 
(environment). Behavioural uncertainty is very relevant, in this context, based on 
headquarters’ familiarly with subsidiary practices and processes associated with foreign 
markets, particularly concerning government regulations, local customs, business networks 
and market developments (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Unfamiliarity arises in many cases 
due to the distance between headquarters and WOFS operations (Moilanen 2007). Bounded 
rationality, referring to limited cognitive and computational ability to arrive at decisions 
(Simon 1945), is problematic where uncertainty is high due to the limits on headquarters 
ability to effectively provide direction at a distance (Williamson 1979, 2005).        
Distinct control problems occur when uncertainty is combined with a second activity trait, 
asset specificity. Asset specificity refers to the extent it is possible to redeploy asset to an 
alternative activity, with larger opportunity costs associated with higher specificity 
(Williamson 1979). Opportunity costs may be further increased in this context due to limits 
on headquarters’ ability to reallocate assets to alternative uses at a distance. High asset 
specificity is related to opportunism, referring to self-interested behaviour of WOFS 
operations employees at the expense of headquarters in this study (Williamson 1975). It is 
expected headquarters use control choices to minimise the risk of loss associated with 
opportunism, possibly more problematic and difficult to deal with at a distance.  
The third activity trait in TCE theory is ex post hoc information impactedness, referring to the 
degree of asymmetry between headquarters and WOFS operations concerning performance 
achievements (Williamson 1979). Asymmetry can only be equalised between these two 
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parties at a cost which is substantial in some cases (Williamson 1996). Such asymmetry may 
be particularly problematic and high concerning WOFS operations, given the distance from 
headquarters resulting in high ex post information impactedness. High ex post hoc 
information impactedness may lead to opportunistic behaviour by WOFS personnel, with 
higher probability of such behaviour at a distance, which headquarters needs to address.  
It could be argued that activity traits (and the presence of human traits) do not capture the 
entirety of factors effecting control choices. While this is true, the advantage of applying the 
TCE theory perspective in this study is it may provide a parsimonious perspective on the 
instrumental factors effecting control choices, rather the fragmented approaches in literature. 
2.2 Management control archetypes and transaction cost economics 
Given activity traits appear to provide a relevant and parsimonious perspective on the WOFS 
operation context, we now need to consider the implications of these on the control choices of 
headquarters. Speklé’s TCE of management control provides a conceptualisation of the link 
between activity traits and control choices. Our intention in this study is not to test Speklé’s 
(2001) theory, but rather use it as a starting point to more holistically consider control choices 
in this context.     
Speklé’s (2001) framework consists of five control archetypes2, which are each aimed at 
addressing distinct control problems associated with different combinations of uncertainty, 
asset specificity and ex post hoc information impactedness (Williamson 1979, 2005). The 
choice of appropriate control archetype is argued to be the one that will economise the 
transaction costs associated with the domain of transactions (the WOFS in our study). In this 
2 Note that Speklé (2001) refers to nine control archetypes relating to market, hybrid and hierarchical 




                                                 
section we detail the control archetypes and explain the expected associations with activity 
traits. (Williamson 1979; Williamson 2005) 
Archetype 1: Arm’s length control 
Arm’s length control is characterised by headquarters extending high autonomy to WOFS 
management, within a framework of targets, monitoring, evaluation and rewards of 
subsidiary management according to market benchmarks. This archetype is appropriate, 
according to Speklé (2001), in situations of low uncertainty, where WOFS performance and 
activities can be specified ex ante, and moderate asset specificity3, allowing the use of market 
benchmarks. In this situation WOFS management decision making is likely to exhibit very 
little bounded rationality, due low uncertainty and specificity of performance and activities ex 
ante. In addition headquarters is likely to  face little opportunism from WOFS operations due 
to the large number of headquarter options associated with resource reallocation, associated 
with moderate asset specificity (Williamson 1979). Accordingly Speklé (2001) argues 
extending high autonomy to WOFS management and monitoring, evaluating and rewarding 
based on market benchmarks is a sufficient means of control.  
Machine Control 
Machine control archetype is appropriate where, according to Speklé (2001), uncertainty is 
relatively low and asset specificity is relatively high. High asset specificity means it is 
difficult for headquarters to deploy WOFS assets to alternative activities. Opportunistic 
WOFS management decisions further exacerbates the potential losses in a context of both 
limited alternative asset deployment opportunities and limited visibility of WOFS operations 
from the perspective of headquarters. The specificity of WOFS performance and activities ex 
ante, low uncertainty, by headquarters provides a means of using this archetype to mitigate 
3 In the context of hierarchical organisation, moderate asset specificity relates to relatively low levels of this 
activity trait. This is because assets of low specificity are usually the domain of the market based transactions. 
Accordingly in the content of hierarchical organisations, asset specificity ranges from moderate to high levels. 
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opportunistic behaviour. According to Speklé’s (2001) headquarters choice of either action or 
results oriented machine control is dependent on its ability to define output targets which are 
meaningful and sufficiently restrictive.  
Archetype 2: Results oriented machine control 
This archetype is characterised by extending high autonomy to WOFS management with an 
emphasis on providing direction through targets internally developed by headquarters. These 
form the basis of monitoring, evaluating and rewarding subsidiary management. This is 
argued to be appropriate in situations of high asset specificity, possible under low 
uncertainty, and, according to Kruis (2008)4, low ex post hoc information impactedness. 
Essentially Kruis (2008) extends the implications of Speklé’s (2001) argument, arguing that 
the choice of machine control is dependent on headquarter’s ability to define meaningful and 
sufficiently restrictive output targets through the connection with ex post hoc information 
impactedness. If headquarters can define sufficiently restrictive administrative targets which 
address the risk associated with high asset specificity, this is a reflection of limited 
information asymmetry between WOFS management and headquarters concerning 
performance achievements, and results oriented machine control is the most relevant 
archetype according to Speklé (2001). Results oriented machine control is efficient from a 
headquarters’ perspective, compared with the substantial costs of exercising action controls 
from a distance. Market benchmarks are not available where asset specificity is high due to 
the relative absence of comparable direct competitors performing similar activities (Anand 
and Singh 1997).  
  
4 Kruis (2008), one of the only studies outside this study to examine Speklé (2001) framework in a hierarchical 
context, provides a detailed explanation on the choice of either action or results oriented machine control 
according to the degree of ex post hoc information impactedness, which is limited in Speklé (2001).  
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Archetype 3: Action oriented machine control 
This archetype is characterised by relatively low to moderate autonomy extended to WOFS 
management and clear standardisation of behavioural expectations. Headquarters place strong 
importance on compliance with standardised behaviour, rules and procedures, through closely 
monitoring WOFS operations (Speklé 2001). It is argued to be appropriate in situations of 
relatively high asset specificity, protecting difficult to redeploy assets where there’s the 
potential for opportunism, possible due to low uncertainty and, according to Kruis (2008) the 
only available archetype choice where ex post hoc information impactedness is high. High ex 
post hoc information impactedness means, there is significant asymmetry between 
headquarters and WOFS management concerning performance achievement, rendering 
results oriented machine control inoperative (Merchant and Van der Stede 2012; Keating 
1997). The cost of exercising such control at a distance may be substantial; however, the 
benefits of mitigating the potential for opportunism in the context of foreign operations may 
be worthwhile (Williamson 1975). 
Archetype 4: Boundary control 
This archetype involves a high degree of autonomy being extended to WOFS management 
with clear guidelines concerning behaviour and activities not to be engaged in. Headquarters 
closely monitor compliance with these boundaries and take action against subsidiary 
management if they are breached. Essentially Speklé (2001) argues headquarters are limited 
to this archetype choice where uncertainty is relatively high, inability to specify WOFS 
performance and activities ex ante, and ex post hoc information impactedness is high, 
significant asymmetry between WOFS management and headquarters concerning 
performance achievement. In some cases, this archetype may be particularly relevant when 
controlling WOFS operations, due to the distance from headquarters (Hansen 2002; Schulz 
2001). Defining the domain of responsibility minimises the risks associated with bounded 
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rationality and/or opportunistic decisions as it prevents, theoretically, WOFS management 
from taking action or making decisions outside their domain of responsibility. Headquarters 
is argued to be limited to this archetype regardless of asset specificity levels, which is why 
this activity trait is argued not to affect the control choice in this case. 
Archetype 5: Exploratory control 
This archetype is characterised by high autonomy extended to WOFS management with 
relevant targets emerging and established during the period, forming the basis of monitoring 
and evaluating performance. There is significant emphasis placed on assessing and rewarding 
subsidiary management on the basis of long term performance. This archetype is argued to be 
appropriate in situations of relatively high uncertainty, due to the inability of headquarters to 
specify performance and activities of a WOFS ex ante and bounded rationality of decisions if 
headquarters attempted to do so (Williamson 1975). Further the use of this archetype is 
possible where ex post hoc information impactedness is low, due to limited asymmetry 
between WOFS management and headquarters concerning performance achievements. 
Accordingly this suggests headquarters are reliant on low levels of ex post hoc information 
impactedness as a means of controlling WOFS operations. Similarly to boundary control as 
above, headquarters only choice of control is argued to be limited to exploratory control in 
this case and the level of asset specificity is not expected to change this situation or the 
archetype choice. 
Figure 1 below (adapted from Kruis, 2008) summarises the association between activity traits 
and control archetypes, as predicted by Speklé (2001). We examine whether these predictions 















































2.3 Insights from exploratory interviews 
A number of exploratory interviews were conducted with senior managers at five firms 
involved in the control of WOFS operations to gain an insight into the applicability of the 
TCE theory of management control in this context. Firm selection was based on those 
expected to have unique sets of activity traits allowing a comprehensive initial investigation 
of the theory. These firms operated in industry sectors including pharmaceutical development 
and manufacturing, construction and development, finance, retail and medical product 
development. One semi-structured interview, lasting two to three hours, was conducted with 
a senior manager (including financial controllers, operations directors and chief executive 
officers) at each firm concerning their control of one particular WOFS.  
Based on the exploratory interviews, a number of potential deviations from Speklé’s (2001) 
conceptualisation are observed in the context of controlling WOFS operations. First, while 
the existence of the control archetypes is observed, multiple control archetypes appear to be 
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adopted by headquarters. This contrasts with the single distinct archetype choices proposed 
by Speklé (2001). The distance between the headquarters and WOFS operations exemplifies 
control problems faced in some cases (Hassel and Cunningham 2004), suggesting control 
through multiple control archetypes is important. It is therefore more appropriate to consider 
headquarters exercising combinations of different control archetypes, rather than choosing 
one individual control archetype5.   
The second deviation from Speklé’s (2001) conceptualisation is certain activity trait levels, in 
combination with control archetype choices, do not align with Speklé’s (2001) predictions. A 
number of control archetypes may be applicable to situations such as low uncertainty, rather 
than a single archetype being the appropriate choice. Accordingly, even though the 
associations proposed between activity traits and archetypes may be intended as the most 
economising method to deal with WOFS transactional activities, these predictions are 
questionable in this context. The challenges associated with operations at a distance, may be 
associated with a broader choice of control archetypes, facilitating tighter control. Further, 
given certain activity trait levels in isolation (or independently) appear associated with the 
use of multiple choice archetypes, this suggests considering the effect of combinations of 
activity traits on control archetype choices is not appropriate. 
The interviews indicate, despite the deviations being observed, Speklé’s (2001) theory is 
applicable and useful in conceptualising the control choices and the activity traits that appear 
to explain variation in these choices. Given our intention in this study is not to test Speklé’s 
(2001) TCE theory of management control, but rather use it as a starting point and means of 
explaining the control of WOFS operations, the deviations concerning the use of multiple 
control archetypes and the independent effect of activity traits on control archetype choices 
5 We recognise that Speklé (2001) suggests that archetypes are exclusive control choices and perhaps a 
combination of archetypes can also be thought of a “control package”. However, for the purposes of simplicity 
we refer to these as “combinations of control archetypes”.  
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have important implications on the research method, the regression analysis, appropriate 
when examining this context. 
3. Evidence from statistical analysis 
3.1 Survey method and responses 
Data collected through a cross-sectional survey6, following the guidance of Dillman (2000) 
and suggests of literature (Tung 2000), enables statistical modelling of the associated 
between activity traits and control choices. Respondents were asked to complete the survey 
with regard to the management of one WOFS they (headquarters) control. A total of 178 
surveys were returned, providing a response rate of 28.80 per cent. After removing nine 
incomplete surveys and ten relating to subsidiaries with zero employees (dormant 
subsidiaries) where control is not relevant, 159 usable surveys remained.7 Respondents 
appeared to be at the company an adequate period of time (mean 9.58 years) to be sufficiently 
knowledgeable to answer the questions. There is a large variation in the size of both 
subsidiaries (1–5,000 employees) and corporations (5–38,000 employees), indicating that a 
broad range of firms replied to the survey. We include a size control variable in our models to 
account for variation in control choices according to this variable (explained later in this 
section). The industry classification of the final sample firms, reported in Panel A of Table 1, 
and WOFS locations, reported in Panel B of Table 1, are representative of Australian 
6 The survey instrument is available upon request from the corresponding author. 
7 The means and standard deviations of the constructs are compared based on early and late respondents (first 
and last 40 per cent respectively of useable responses which provided a clear distinction between the initial 
survey mail out and the later follow up stages). The means of the constructs for early and late respondents are 
not significantly different, similar as confirmed by the‘t’ statistics, notwithstanding asset specificity where the 
difference is statistically significant. This difference may be due to the relative ease of contacting managers at 
headquarters with more asset specific operations, due to the greater risks and consequently closer focus on 
operations. However, in any case, the size of this difference may not be economically significant and, given all 
other constructs, are not significantly different we assume that there is no systematic bias in our data.  
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business involvement.8 The diversity of WOFS operations in our sample is expected to be 
associated with a large variation in activity traits and associated problems. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.2 Evidence on control choices 
While the interviews suggest headquarters choose multiple rather than individual archetypes 
to control a WOFS, the different sets of control mechanisms chosen appear aligned with the 
archetype conceptualisations. Accordingly there are different combinations of control 
archetypes exercised and we measure the degree to which these are represented, rather than 
identify one particular archetype headquarters selects in each case. The survey questions and 
indicators to operationalise the different archetypes, as conceptualised by Speklé (2001), are 
adapted from Kruis (2008). Kruis’ (2008) survey questions and indicators directly relate to 
the measurement of Speklé’s (2001) framework and in this study are adapted to the context of 
controlling WOFS operations. The control archetype indicators are summarised in Table 2. 
The indicators measure the extent to which headquarters choose a particular control archetype 
and are reflective indicators. The ticked boxes indicate the proposed management control 
indicators of each control archetype listed across the top of the table.  
 [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
To test whether there are a number of different management control archetypes in use, we 
utilise Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (Jarvis, Mackenzie, and Podsakoff 2003). Items 
which have lower than acceptable rotated factor loadings and PCA communalities (generally 
lower than 0.5) are removed from the factor analysis. The final factor loadings and PCA 
8 Nevertheless we rerun our tests excluding mining companies from the sample and the results do not 
significantly change.  
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communities, reported in Table 3, are high in most cases, with those remaining closely 
describing the main and unique characteristics of each control archetype. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
The internal consistency of each control archetype construct, with the reflective indicators 
(composite reliability), is assessed through using Cronbach’s Alpha (Cronbach 1951). All 
Cronbach Alpha values are higher or close to 0.70, reported in Table 4, indicating the control 
archetype constructs have acceptable composite reliability and the control archetypes are 
valid representations of different sets of control choices.   
 [INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Both the individual PCA and composite reliability statistics indicate that the five control 
archetypes appear to be representative of the sets of control choices exercised.  
The discriminant validity of the control archetypes relates to the ability to discriminate a set 
of indicators measuring one construct from those of other constructs (more variance is shared 
between the indicators of a construct than any other indicators representing a different 
construct). It is assessed by comparing the square root of the average variance extracted 
(AVE) to the correlations between each construct (Fornell and Larcker 1981), presented in 
Table 5 below. If the square root of the AVE for a construct is higher than the correlations 
with other constructs, this indicates acceptable discriminant validity.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
The value of the square root of AVE for each construct (values in bold) is higher than the 
Pearson correlations between all constructs, with the exception of action oriented machine 
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and boundary control. Accordingly it may be problematic to discriminate between action 
oriented machine and boundary control, given they are relatively direct forms of control.  
The results of the factors analysis, composite reliability and discriminant validity testing, 
indicate the control archetypes conceptualised by Speklé (2001) are representative of distinct 
control archetypes. However, it is important to note these results suggest limits to the degree 
the archetypes are single independent control choices, as indicated by the lower discriminant 
validity statistics in some cases. This is consistent with the interview suggestions, that 
multiple archetypes are used. 
3.3 Associations between activity traits and control archetype choice 
In order to measure both the activity traits and the control archetype constructs, the relevant 
indicators are combined through simple additive aggregation, consistent with the control 
archetype constructs. Each activity trait is defined and measured as follows: 
i. Uncertainty: The specificity of performance and activities (ex ante) relates to the 
degree headquarters can provide direction consistent with the goals and objectives of 
the WOFS operations. Ambiguous goals and objectives are associated with limited 
headquarters’ knowledge of WOFS activities, and accordingly high uncertainty. To 
measure uncertainty, indicators are adapted from Kruis (2008) and Rainey (1983) 
based on headquarters degree of clarity in these four areas: clarity of goals; specificity 
of goals; clarity of goals to outsiders; and goals known to insiders.  
ii. Asset specificity: Both human and physical asset specificity are relevant in the context 
of international operations (Klein, Frazier, and Roth 1990; Sridharan and Akroyd 
2011). Intangible assets relating to branding and product expertise are also relevant in 
the contemporary business context (Henri 2006). Accordingly, the following 
indicators are used to measure asset specificity based on the extent the following 
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factors can be redeployed to alternative uses if WOFS operations cease: employee 
skills (human); training of employees (human); physical assets (physical assets); 
technological systems (physical assets); product customisation expertise (product); 
and reputational capital (brand name).  
iii. Ex post hoc information impactedness: Ex post hoc information impactedness is 
measured based on the relative information headquarters has compared with WOFS 
management concerning performance achievements, thereby measuring asymmetry. 
This is measured using the following indicators, concerning headquarters relative 
information of WOFS operations compared with subsidiary management, adapted 
from Dunk (1993): activities undertaken by subsidiary; operational processes 
performed by subsidiary; realisation of subsidiary performance potential; impact of 
external factors on performance; and understanding subsidiary achievements. 
The validity of these activity trait constructs was examined through conducting a factor 
analysis of the indicators to determine the composite reliability and discriminant validity 
(including control archetype constructs). These statistics indicate the constructs are valid, 
expected given the well-established nature of these measures. Descriptive statistics of the 
constructs, minimum, maximum and standard deviation statistics indicate there is significant 
variation in the data, and no significant floors or ceiling in the data. This alleviates any 
possible concern of limited variation in activity traits and control archetypes due to the focus 
on the WOFS operations context.  
A series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are run, consistent with insights gained 
from the interviews conducted. These OLS regressions using continuous variables, based on 
the simple additive aggregation of indicators for each construct, are appropriate as they allow 
the effect of varying levels of independent activity traits on control archetypes choices to be 
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examined. Higher construct values indicate higher levels of an activity trait or greater use of a 
control archetype. 
The association between activity traits and arm’s length control is tested using Equation 1. 
Significant and negative coefficients for α1 (uncertainty) and α2 (asset specificity) indicate 
support for Speklé’s (2001) arguments. Moderate asset specificity is argued to be associated 
with arm’s length control; in the hierarchical organisational context this indicates asset 
specificity is relatively low as low asset specificity is applicable to market based transactions. 
Accordingly this is why a negative coefficient is predicted concerning α2 (asset specificity).   
ARM_CONTROLi = α0 + α1UNCERTAINTYi + α2ASSET_SPECi + α3SIZEi + εi        
(1) 
The association between activity traits and results oriented machine control is tested using 
Equation 2. A significant and negative coefficient for α1 (uncertainty), significant positive 
coefficient for α2 (asset specificity), and significant negative coefficient for α3 (ex post hoc 
information impactedness), indicates support for Speklé’s (2001) arguments.     
RESULTS_CONTROLi = α0 + α1UNCERTAINTYi + α2ASSET_SPECi + 
α3EX_POST_ HOC_INFO_IMPACi + α4SIZEi + εi                                                                    
(2) 
The association between activity traits and action oriented machine control is tested using 
Equation 3. A significant and negative coefficient for α1 (uncertainty), significant positive 
coefficient for α2 (asset specificity), and significant positive coefficient for α3 (ex post hoc 
information impactedness), indicates support for Speklé’s (2001) arguments.     
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ACTION_CONTROLi = α0 + α1UNCERTAINTYi + α2ASSET_SPECi+ α3EX_POST_ 
HOC_INFO_IMPACi + α4SIZEi + εi                                                                        (3) 
The association between activity traits and boundary control is tested using Equation 4. 
Significant positive coefficients for both α1 (uncertainty) and α2 (ex post hoc information 
impactedness) indicate support for Speklé’s (2001) arguments.     
BOUNDARY_CONTROLi = α0 + α1UNCERTAINTYi + α2EX_POST_HOC_INFO_ 
IMPACi +   α3SIZEi + εi          (4)                                                                                                      
The association between activity traits and exploratory control is tested using Equation 5. A 
significant positive coefficient for α1 (uncertainty) and significant negative coefficient for α2 
(ex post hoc information impactedness) indicate support for Speklé’s (2001) arguments. 
EXPLORATORY_CONTROLi = α0 + α1UNCERTAINTYi + α2 EX_POST_HOC_ 
INFO_IMPACi + α3 SIZEi + εi             (5)                                                                                                    
Not all activity traits are included in all equations (ex post hoc information impactedness 
concerning arm’s length control and asset specificity concerning boundary and exploratory 
control) as they are not relevant in determining the choices of control (Speklé 2001).  
SIZE is based on the total number of employees (including the focal WOFS) of the whole 
corporation the headquarters is controlling. Literature indicates size is an important control 
variable (Chenhall 2003). We do not include other control variables. The activity traits in 
TCE theory are argued to be a parsimonious, yet comprehensive enough to explain the 
control archetypes choices.  
The OLS regression results, examining whether activity traits determine the choice of 
management control archetypes, are reported in Table 6. 
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Arm’s length control – Equation 1 
The coefficients concerning both uncertainty (α1 = –0.414, t = –1.786) and asset specificity 
(α2 = –0.052, t = –0.653) are negative, consistent with predictions. While the uncertainty 
coefficient is significant at the 10 per cent level, the asset specificity coefficient is 
insignificant at all conventional levels. The F-statistic (1.978) indicates the model does not 
have significant predictive ability at conventional levels and the variation in control archetype 
use explained is quite low (R2 =  0.018). Accordingly there is little support for the predictions.  
Results oriented machine control – Equation 2 
All results concerning the coefficients are insignificant (uncertainty: α1 = –0.042, t =               
–0.550; asset specificity: α2 = –0.045, t = –0.595; ex post hoc information impactedness: α3 = 
–0.029, t = –0.378) with the exception of subsidiary size (control variable, α4 = 0.313, t = 
4.041). Accordingly there is no support for the predictions; however larger corporations rely 
more heavily headquarters on results oriented machine control. The F-statistic (4.321) 
indicates the model does have significant predictive ability and the R2 is 0.078.  
Action oriented machine control – Equation 3 
The results indicate uncertainty (α1 = –0.249, t = –3.442) is negatively and significantly 
associated with action oriented machine control, consistent with predictions. Further, both 
asset specificity (α2 = –0.141, t = –1.957) and ex post hoc information impactedness (α3 =      
–0.294, t = –4.036) are negatively and significantly associated with this control archetype, 
opposite to Speklé’s (2001) predictions. The relatively high F-statistic (10.098) and R square 
(0.187) indicates the model has significant predictive ability and explanatory power.  
Boundary control – Equation 4 
The results indicate uncertainty (α1 = –0.302, t = –4.164) and ex post hoc information 
impactedness (α2 = –0.280, t = –3.824) are negatively and significantly associated with 
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boundary control use, the opposite of Speklé’s (2001) predictions. The model has high 
predictive ability and explanatory power indicated by the F-statistic (12.623) and R squared 
(0.181).   
Exploratory control – Equation 5 
The results indicate ex post hoc information impactedness (α2 = –0.246, t = –3.205) is 
significantly negatively associated with exploratory control, consistent with predictions. 
Uncertainty (α1 = –0.175, t = –2.262) is also negatively and significantly associated with 
exploratory control, the opposite of Speklé’s (2001) predictions. The F-statistic (5.778) 
indicates the model does have significant predictive ability and the R2 is 0.083.  
The results indicate some support for Speklé’s (2001) predictions and the appropriateness of 
taking into account the deviations observed from the original conceptualisation in the 
regression design. While our intention in this study is to examine headquarters’ control of 
WOFS operations, rather than a direct test of Speklé’s (2001) original theory, a direct test 
would serve the purpose of demonstrating whether or not our modified version of Speklé’s 
(2001) theory is more relevant in explaining control choices in this context. Accordingly, 
before discussing these results further, Speklé’s (2001) original theory is tested next.  
 4. Additional testing 
Speklé (2001) argues particular combinations of activity traits are associated with distinct 
control archetypes. Accordingly, to directly test the original theory, it is important to identify 
whether or not headquarters are using a particular control archetype and to determine the 
association of this choice with the combined variation of activity traits. Consistent with 
Speklé (2001), and to test whether control archetypes are determined by combinations of 
activity traits, we formulate the following multinominal logistic regression: 
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CONTROL_ ARCHETYPE = α0 + α1AT_INTERACTIONi + α2UNCERTAINTYi + 
α3ASSET_SPECi + α4 EX_POST_HOC_ INFO_IMPACi  + α5SIZEi +  εi                                                          
(6)                               
where: 
CONTROL_ARCHETYPE is a dependent variable classifying which control archetype 
headquarters primarily exercises. To determine which archetypes is the primary type 
exercised, the construct values of all archetypes are compared to find the highest one. This 
dependent variable is then coded accordingly (1–5, relating to each control archetype) to 
identify which control archetype is primarily exercised9.  
AT_INTERACTION is included in the multinational logistic regression as an interaction 
variable, defining situations where Speklé (2001) argues particular control archetypes are 
appropriate. This variable is based on the result of multiplying together activity trait 
constructs relevant in the determination of a particular control archetype choice. High 
variable values indicate situations where Speklé (2001) argues a particular control archetype 
is appropriate. Certain activity trait constructs are reversed to calculate this variable, so that a 
higher value reflects a situation where a particular control archetype is argued by Speklé 
(2001) to be appropriate.  
The results10 indicate that while the model chi-squares are significant and more than 50 per 
cent of control archetypes are correctly classified, the independent activity trait interaction 
variable is insignificant in all models with the exception of exploratory control use relative to 
arm’s length control (Coefficient -1.881, Wald 3.056, significant at the 10% level). While 
9 T-tests confirm the construct values for the primary control archetype are higher than the non-primary 
archetype when compared on an individual control archetype construct basis and all control archetype construct 
basis. 
10 In the interests of maintaining the length of this paper to an acceptable level, the results of the additional 
testing are not reported in table form. However these results tables are all available from the authors by request. 
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some of the independent activity trait variables are significant, there is little alignment with 
Speklé’s (2001) predictions. The results indicate Speklé’s (2001) original theory is not 
supported in the context of headquarters controlling WOFS operations. 
Given almost all of the activity trait interaction variables are insignificant, the models are re-
run excluding the interaction variables. A greater number of independent activity trait 
variable coefficients are significant, however the percentage of control archetypes correctly 
classified (while high in some cases) is zero for the control archetypes of arm’s length and 
action control. The interview analysis suggests headquarters use different combinations of 
control archetypes, so the fact that some are have zero percentage correctly classified is 
problematic. The identification of the control archetype headquarters use to the greatest 
extent does not appear to be appropriate or effective in capturing the true associations.  
A series of further models are also run to examine whether there are alternative and possibly 
more appropriate ways of interpreting, applying and testing Speklé’s (2001) theory to 
understand the control of WOFS operations. We re-run the OLS regression models (in section 
3 above) with the inclusion of the activity trait interaction variables, run binary logistic 
regressions with a dependent dummy variable based on whether not a control archetype is 
used as the primary choice of control and an OLS regression with the dependent continuous 
variable based on the extent one control archetype is exercised relative to others. The results 
of the additional testing indicate the OLS regression model results, presented in Table 6, are 




5. Results discussion 
The first set of OLS regression results, taking into account the deviations observed from 
Speklé’s (2001) original conceptualisation, are the most significant set of results. This is 
consistent with the insights and suggestions from the exploratory interviews. The results are 
now discussed. 
Arm’s length control 
The regression results indicate, regardless of activity trait coefficients and significance levels, 
the arm’s length control model is insignificant according to the F-stat. This may be related to 
the context of controlling operations from a distance, where the redeployment of assets is 
more difficult, and relying on arm’s length control as the basis of directing asset use and 
protection may be not adequate or appropriate in this context (Teece, Shuen, and Pisano 
1997; Hansen 1999; Nilsson 2002). Further, arm’s length control involves the establishment 
of relevant benchmarks and the distance separating headquarters from subsidiary operations 
means establishing these benchmarks may not be practical compared with home country 
operations (Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997). As observed in the interviews, Speklé’s (2001) 
theory may not apply uniformly to all contexts. Headquarters may not consider arm’s length 
control effective, particularly concerning the protection of assets, explaining the 
insignificance of the arm’s length control model. 
Results oriented machine control 
The lack of significant results for model two could be explained by the wide spread use of 
results oriented machine control as means of control (Sandino 2007), consistent with 
elements of this archetype notable in a number of the firms where managers were 
interviewed. Results oriented machine control may provide one of the few means of clear 
objective communication of subsidiary performance available when controlling from a 
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distance (Argyres 1995). The descriptive statistics in this study confirms the widespread use 
in this context, while there substantial variability in the choice of results oriented machine 
control (Likert scale choice ranging from 2.097 to 5.000), the mean choice is 4.150 which is 
relatively high. It appears headquarters are willing to invest in this control given the expected 
benefits of clear objective communication of performance, even though it appears 
inconsistent with activity traits observed.  
Action oriented machine control 
Consistent with predictions, uncertainty is significantly and negatively associated with action 
oriented machine control. Further, it is predicted asset specificity is positively associated with 
action oriented machine control, particularly given the difficulties of redeploying high 
specific assets at a distance (Chandler 1991). The results are opposite to predictions, 
suggesting headquarters doesn’t have sufficient knowledge, resources or confidence to 
effectively direct the use of highly specific assets at a distance (Monteiro, Arvidsson, and 
Birkinshaw 2008; Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997). This suggests it is more appropriate to 
extend WOFS management autonomy, given their proximity and relative ability to protect 
and maximise asset returns. 
The results also indicate headquarters exercise action oriented machine control to a greater 
extent where ex post hoc information impactedness low, opposite to Speklé’s (2001) 
predictions. Speklé’s (2001) argument is based on the comparatively lower costs of results 
oriented machine control, but disregards the effectiveness of action oriented machine control 
in situations of low ex post hoc information impactedness. Results suggest headquarters use 
performance information associated with low ex post hoc information impactedness to make 
more informed action control oriented machine control choices. Accordingly the feedback 
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loop concerning results oriented machine controls (Merchant and Van der Stede 2012) may 
also apply to action oriented machine control use in this context.       
Boundary control 
The negative association with uncertainty and ex post hoc information impactedness is the 
opposite of Speklé’s (2001) predictions. Accordingly, this suggests the ability to exercise this 
control archetype may be possible where uncertainty and ex post hoc information 
impactedness is low. Setting inappropriate boundaries where headquarters lacks the ability to 
specify the performance and activities of subsidiary activities and performance may 
significantly impede the autonomy of subsidiary management, particularly at a distance, to 
maximise returns from operations (Merchant and Van der Stede 2012). Considering the 
consequences of inappropriate boundaries, the use of boundary control in situations of low 
uncertainty and ex post hoc information impactedness appears appropriate. 
Exploratory control 
The negative association with uncertainty is the opposite of Speklé’s (2001) predictions, 
suggesting the ability to set and monitor relevant targets throughout a period is associated 
with headquarters’ knowledge of subsidiary operations (Ouchi 1979). Accordingly, rather 
than headquarters being limited to exploratory control where uncertainty is high, the ability to 
exercise this control archetype is possible where uncertainty is low.  
6. Summary and conclusions 
Applying Speklé’s (2001) TCE theory of management control as a starting point in this study 
aids the examination of headquarters’ control of WOFS operations. Two aspects of this 
theory that are applied to examine this context. First, whether different control choices are 
characterised by the control archetype choices proposed by Speklé (2001). Second, whether 
the choice of control is a function of the economic characteristics (activity traits) of the firm.  
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We conducted a series of interviews to provide insights into the applicability of the TCE 
theory of management control in this context and subsequently statistically analysed cross-
sectional survey data. The interviews facilitated the identification of a number of potential 
deviations from Speklé’s (2001) theory. In particular these relate to the use of combinations 
of multiple control archetypes and the independent effects of activity traits (low uncertainty 
and ex post hoc information impactedness) on the use of these archetypes. The regression 
results indicate when taking into account multiple control archetypes are exercised by 
headquarters and the independent effects of activity traits on these choices, TCE theory and 
Speklé (2001) conceptualisation were relevant in explaining the control choices of 
headquarters. A number of alternative regression modelling approaches to test Speklé’s 
(2001) theory are conducted, with few significant results observed.   
While the activity traits may not have been as comprehensive as expected in explaining 
headquarters control choices, they still appear to be a parsimonious and informative. The 
selection of multiple control archetypes to control WOFS operations appears important in this 
context, given the challenges associated with WOFS operations at a distance. It would be 
interesting to examine the effect of these control choices on performance in a future study 
(Speklé and Verbeeten 2013). This would confirm whether the use of multiple archetypes is 
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 Table 1 – Respondent characteristics 
Panel A – Industry classification of sample firms 
Industry Corporation Subsidiary 
Frequency* Percentage Frequency* Percentage 
Mining 46 20.4% 37 18.5% 
Manufacturing 38 16.8% 27 13.5% 
Other Services 26 11.5% 26 13.0% 
Professional, Scientific & Technical 
Services 18 8.0% 19 9.5% 
Information Media & 
Telecommunications 16 7.1% 15 7.5% 
Finance & Insurance Services 13 5.8% 12 6.0% 
Wholesale Trade 13 5.8% 16 8.0% 
Construction 11 4.9% 10 5.0% 
Electricity, Gas, Water & Waste Services 8 3.5% 8 4.0% 
Retail Trade 7 3.1% 5 2.5% 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 6 2.7% 5 2.5% 
Health Care & Social Assistance 6 2.7% 6 3.0% 
Transport, Postal & Warehousing 6 2.7% 4 2.0% 
Administrative & Support Services 5 2.2% 4 2.0% 
Rental, Hiring & Real Estate Services 3 1.3% 4 2.0% 
Accommodation & Food Services 1 0.4% 0 0.0% 
Arts & Recreation Services 1 0.4% 1 0.5% 
Education & Training 1 0.4% 1 0.5% 
Public Administration & Safety 1 0.4% 0 0.0% 
*Total frequency higher than sample size (159) due to some firms indicating involvement in multiple industries. 
 
 
Panel B – Subsidiary location 
Region Frequency Percentage 
North America 42 26.42% 
Asia 34 21.38% 
Oceania 34 21.38% 
Europe 27 16.98% 
Africa 16 10.06% 
Middle East 4 2.52% 





 Table 2 – Proposed indicators of control archetypes 


















ities defined         
2 Autonomy extended to 
subsidiary management   (reversed)    
3 HQ management by 
exception         
4 Transparency of 
information flow 
(between HQ and 
subsidiary) 
         
Standardisation 
Action 
5 Boundaries delineated           
6 Codification of actions 
(rules & instructions)          
7 Standardised systems          
Targets 
8 Codification of targets 
(internally determined)          
9 Flexibility of targets   (reversed)       
10 Broad HQ performance 
expectations          
11 Emergent HQ 
performance expectations          
12 Set limits on activities           
Monitoring & performance 
evaluation 
13 Adherence to codified 
actions (policies and 
procedures) monitored 
         
14 Monitoring & evaluation 
based on codified targets          
15 Monitoring & evaluation 
according to market 
benchmarks 
         
16 Long term performance 
assessment          
17 Subjectivity in 
performance evaluation          
18 HQ periodically checking 
compliance with 
boundaries 
         
Rewards 
19 Punishment for not 
complying with codified 
actions 
         
20 Rewards based on 
codified evaluation          
21 Rewards tied to market 
based performance 
evaluation 
         
22 Reward through 
promotion          
23 Subjectivity in reward 
determination          
24 Severe sanctions for 
crossing boundaries          
37 
 







Arm’s length control   
Monitoring & evaluation according to market benchmarks 
(MCI15) 
0.923 0.852 
Rewards tied to market based performance evaluation (MCI21) 0.923 0.852 
   
Results oriented machine control   
Codifications of targets (MCI8) 0.766 0.586 
Monitoring & evaluation based on codified targets (MCI14) 0.883 0.779 
Rewards based on codified evaluation (MCI20) 0.847 0.717 
   
Action oriented machine control   
Codification of actions (MCI6) 0.776 0.602 
Adherence to codified actions (MCI13) 0.845 0.714 
Punishment for not complying with codified actions (MCI19) 0.755 0.570 
   
Boundary control   
Boundaries delineated (MCI 5) 0.806 0.650 
HQ periodically checking compliance with boundaries (MCI 18) 0.768 0.590 
Severe sanctions for crossing boundaries (MCI 24) 0.769 0.591 
   
Exploratory control   
Transparency of information flow (MCI 4) 0.680 0.463 
Flexibility of targets (MCI 9) 0.712 0.507 
Broad HQ performance expectations (MCI 10) 0.673 0.454 
Subjectivity in performance evaluation (MCI 17) 0.601 0.361 
 
Table 4 – Control archetype composite reliability 
Construct Cronbach’s Alpha 
Arm’s length control 0.826 
Results oriented machine control 0.775 
Action oriented machine control 0.701 
Boundary control 0.678 
Exploratory control 0.584 
 
Table 5 – Square root of AVE and control archetype correlations 










Arm’s length control 0.923     
Results oriented 
machine control 0.426 0.833 
   
Action oriented 
machine control 0.327 0.402 0.793 
  
Boundary control 0.315 0.374 0.816 0.781  




Table 6 – OLS regression based on modified version of Speklé (2001) 
Equation 
Control 
archetype Uncertainty Asset specificity 







Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat F-stat  (p-value) 
1 Arm’s length –0.414 –1.786* –0.052 –0.653 n/a  0.124 1.566 0.018 1.978       (0.120) 
2 Results –0.042 –0.550 –0.046 –0.595 –0.029 –0.378 0.313 4.041*** 0.078 4.321*** (0.002) 
3 Action –0.249 –3.442*** –0.141 –1.957* –0.294 –4.036*** 0.204 2.809*** 0.187 10.098*** (0.000) 
4 Boundary –0.302 –4.164*** n/a  –0.280 –3.824*** 0.158 2.168** 0.181 12.623*** (0.000) 
5 Exploratory –0.246 –3.205*** n/a  –0.175 –2.262** 0.071 0.921 0.083 5.778*** (0.001) 
***Significant at the 0.01 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level; *Significant at the 0.10 level 
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